1. Overview
The Datadog integration reads reliability controls, service context, dashboards, notebooks, events, and access diagnostics through an organization API key plus a scoped application key.
The Datadog site is part of the account boundary. Seedling supports documented US, EU, Asia-Pacific, and government sites without silently redirecting between them.
2. Connection and scope
Seedling verifies the provider account before storing the connection. A personal connection remains actor-owned; a workspace connection is administered for the selected Seedling workspace. Credentials are never inferred from an email address or silently promoted between scopes.
- Datadog API and application keys
- Use an organization API key and an application key owned by an administrator or service account, scoped to the released read capabilities for the exact Datadog site.
- Connection ownership
- Seedling supports actor-owned personal access and administrator-managed workspace access for this connector. The selected scope and exact connection remain fixed through synchronization, rotation, disconnect, and purge.
3. Datadog data Seedling accesses
Seedling uses synchronized information for source-backed search, operating context, verification, and customer-approved workflows. Availability depends on the connected account, selected resources, provider plan, and native permissions.
- Reliability controls
- Monitors, alert state, SLOs, incidents, severity, ownership, and timelines.
- Service context
- Software Catalog services, teams, tags, dependencies, and available ownership metadata.
- Operational knowledge
- Dashboards, notebooks, events, users, teams, restriction policies, and audit events returned by the keys.
4. Read-only permission contract
Scope the Datadog application key to the exact released read capabilities.
- monitors_read, dashboards_read, and slos_read — reliability configuration and status.
- incident_read — incident records and response timelines.
- apm_service_catalog_read — services, ownership, and dependency context.
- user_access_read and teams_read — attribution and team diagnostics.
- restriction_policies_read — restriction policy evidence without claiming complete object ACL projection.
- audit_logs_read — relevant operational audit events.
- No monitor, dashboard, SLO, incident, service, user, team, restriction-policy, or audit mutation is requested.
5. Security and access
- Provider credentials and other connection secrets are encrypted in the workspace tenant data plane, never returned to the browser, and excluded from logs and queue payloads.
- Every source, synchronization, secret lookup, audience contribution, disconnect, and purge remains bound to the exact connection that created it.
- The provider does not expose enough complete object-level audience evidence for Seedling to reproduce native permissions safely. Workspace content therefore uses the connection's restricted-by-default workspace-or-no-human-access policy; administrator and steward status grant no raw-content bypass.
- For a personal connection, raw content remains visible only to the connecting member in human-facing Seedling surfaces. Personal content may contribute to trusted system exploration under workspace policy, but that authority never transfers to another member.
- Generated output cannot bypass Seedling's human review, verification, and approval gates.
6. Retention and deletion
- Connected data
- Synchronized Datadog records remain while the connection is active and are removed through a durable integration purge after disconnect.
- Credentials
- Stored Datadog credentials or connection secrets and connection-owned synchronization state are deleted from active Seedling systems as part of the purge.
- Backups
- Deleted information may remain in encrypted, access-restricted backups until expiry, ordinarily within 35 days after active-system deletion.